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THE INDONESIAN ISLAM: 
LAW AND THE IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
 Abstrak: Islam Indonesia: Perspektif Ideologis dan Hukum. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk 
mengungkap perkembangan Islam di Indonesia dengan titik berat pada aspek ideologis dan 
pengaruhnya pada hukum Islam. Seperti dimaklumi, sejak awal abad ke-dua puluh, ada dua 
bentuk ideologi yang hidup di kalangan umat Islam Indonesia; Ideologi pertama percaya bahwa 
konsistensi dengan tradisi sangatlah penting sementara ideologi yang lain percaya bahwa ajaran 
Islam dapat berubah sesuai dengan tempat dan waktu. Meski berbeda orientasi, kedua ideologi 
tersebut sebenarnya sama-sama memiliki kepedulian terhadap dunia politik. Di dunia politik, kedua 
ideologi itu, dengan karakternya masing-masing, kemudian berhadapan dengan ideologi nasionalis 
sekuler. Kompetisi itu yang kemudian berujung kepada kegagalan dan membuat perkembangan 
umat Islam di Indonesia surut ke belakang. Setelah gagal dalam bidang politik, kedua ideologi 
tersebut mengubah orientasi mereka menjadi Islam kultural. Melalui orientasi ini, sikap saling 
memahami mulai terbangun antara antara umat Islam dan pemerintah. Bahkan, pada tahapan 
berikutnya, pemerintah, khususnya rezim Orde Baru, mengidentifikasikan dirinya dengan kegiatan 
keagamaan dan memberikan kesempatan untuk mempromosikan nilai-nilai Islam. Lewat hubungan 
yang demikian itulah hukum Islam di Indonesia secara berangsur-angsur berkembang.
 Kata Kunci: Islam Indonesia, hukum, ideologi
 Abstract: The Indonesian Islam: Law and the Ideological Perspective. This article is aimed 
at exploring the development of Islam in Indonesia with particular references to the ideological 
perspective and its impact on Islamic law. At the beginning of the twentieth century, there were two 
ideologies in Indonesian Muslims. The first ideology believes that the consistence with traditions 
is very important while the other believes that Islamic teachings are able to change according to 
time and place. Although having difference in orientation, both ideologies devoted themselves to 
social, religious and political activities. In political sphere, however, both ideologies, were faced with 
secular nationalist ideology. Such a competition ended with a failure that made Indonesian Muslims 
receding into the background. After realizing of the failure in politics, both ideologies turn their 
orientation to cultural Islam. Through this orientation, peaceful and mutual understanding between 
Muslims and state began to grow. Subsequently, the government, especially New Order regime, 
identified itself with the religious activities and opened a chance to promote Islamic values. It was 
from such a relationship that the Islamic law gradually developed in Indonesia. 
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Introduction
The development of Indonesian Islam is 
a very interesting religious phenomenon 
in Indonesian history. Islam in Indonesia 
grew from historical fact, the penetration of 
Islam in Indonesia was peacefully integrated 
with the native people, and until the 
nineteenth century Islam was the dominant 
religion.1 But, at the same time, there were 
1 Fachry Ali, Bahtiar Effendy, Merambah Jalan Baru Islam, 
(Bandung: Mizan, 1986), p. 39.
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no organized Muslim activities until the 
appearance of some Muslims, who brought 
some certain ideological orientations.2 By 
the twentieth century the position of those 
some Indonesian Muslims was becoming 
gradually strong, and started to advocate 
the idea of Islamizing life. In holding such 
idea, a great responsibility was reflected in 
the Muslims’ struggle in adopting Islamic 
values with the Indonesian way of life, in 
particular with that of Muslims. In doing so, 
different ideologies arose among Indonesian 
Muslims in the social and political areas. This 
intention is hoped giving understanding that 
although as a dominant religion, Islam in 
Indonesia is not “finish[ed]” as a historical 
product, and is still evolving.3 
The Ideological Orientation: 
Socio-Religious Activities
At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
there were two ideologies in Indonesian 
Muslims. The first ideology is the belief 
of the consistence with traditions is very 
important.4 The Muslims who hold this 
ideology believe in the eternal truth of 
the teachings of the great scholars of 
classical Islam.5 They depend strongly on 
ulamâ’s thought from the seventh to the 
thirteenth century.6 The other ideology 
believes that Islamic teachings are able to 
change according to time and place. This 
division of ideological perspective then 
colored the social and political atmosphere 
of Indonesian Muslims before and even after 
the Independence of Indonesia.7
2 C. A. 0. Van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects of Islam in Post-
Colonial Indonesia, (Bandung: W. Van Hoeve Ltd., 1958), p. 35.
3 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, “Islam in Indonesia: Cultural 
Opportunity,” Mizan No. 1, Vol. 1 (1984), p. 6.
4 Fachry Ali, Bahtiar Effendy, Merambah Jalan, p. 48.
5 Allan Samson, “Conception of Politics, Power, and 
Ideology, in Contemporary Indonesian Islam,” In Political 
Power and Communications in Indonesia, Eds. Karl D. Jackson 
and Lucian W. Pye, 196-226, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1978), p. 199.
6 Ahmad Syafi’i Maarif, Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan, 
(Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987), p. 57.
7 Abdul Aziz and others, Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di 
Indonesia, (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1989), p. 7; Rosihan Anwar, 
Since the existence of two ideological 
distinctions is concerned, a long debate among 
Indonesian Muslims has started. The debate 
centers on the question of the individual 
use of reasoning in the interpretation of 
al-Qur’ân. The second ideology frequently 
refers to the authority of nineteenth century 
reformers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani 
and Muhammad ‘Abduh. Meanwhile the first 
ideology holds to classical ulamâ’, such as 
al-Baghawi, and argues that a Muslim who 
does not thoroughly know Arabic, the Qur’an, 
the Sunnah of the prophet, the writings of 
the scientists and the Qiyas is not equipped 
to make his own interpretations of Islamic 
law. If one is not a scholar, the guidance 
and authority of the religious teachers, 
ulamâ’, are indispensable.8 Difference also 
arises because of distinct interpretations of 
Islamic rituals. These differences occur in 
the various interpretations of fiqh. But most 
ritual disputes do not involve the basic faith. 
Although they adifferent in orientation, 
both ideologies devoted themselves to social 
and political activities.9 This attention was 
intended to transform the Indonesian Muslims’ 
faith from quantity as the dominant religion 
to the quality level.10 Their socio-religious 
activities occurred, in the first half of the 
twentieth century, on a regional or national 
scope generally in two regions: Minangkabau 
(West Sumatra) and Java Island.11 The main 
achievement of their socio-religious activities 
was the Islamic reform in the education, that 
was the introduction of the modern school 
system to Islamic education, and a deeper 
understanding of Islamic teachings as well.12 
“Islam and Politics in Indonesia,” in Man, State, and Society in 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, ed. Robert 0, Tilman, (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 118.
8 Rosihan Anwar, “Islam and Politics”, p. 119.
9 Abdul Aziz and others, Gerakan Islam Kontemporer, p. 3-4.
10 Ahmad Syafi’i Maarif, “Islam in Indonesia”, p. 6.
11 James L. Peacock, Gerakan Muhammadiyah Memburnikan 
Ajaran Islam di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Cipta Kreatif, 1986), p. 26.
12 Clifford Geertz,” Modernization in a Muslim Society: 
The Indonesian Case,” in Man, State, and Society in Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, ed. Robert 0. Tilman, (New York: Praeger 
Publisher, 1969), p. 206.
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The Islamic reform first introduced by the 
ulamâ’ Ahmad Khatib from Minangkabau. 
He was one of the greatest teachers of the 
shafi’i madhhab in al-Masjid al- Haram. He 
taught some Indonesian Muslims during their 
pilgrimage, and later, they too became great 
teachers and reformists in Indonesia. While he 
was teaching his students, he did not forbid 
them to read and study ‘Abduh’s writings, like 
al-Urwat al-Wuthqa and Tafsir al-Manar.13 
Some of his students to become reformists in 
Minangkabau are Shaikh Muhammad Taher 
Jalalaluddin, Shaikh Muhammad Djamil 
Djambek, Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah and 
Haji Abdullah Ahmad. Moreover, in Java, 
they are Kiyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan, the 
founder of Muhammadiyah, and Kiyai Haji 
Hasjim Asjari, the founder of Nahdhatul 
Ulamâ’(Revival/Awakening of Religious 
Scholars).14 Ahmad khatib also wrote on the 
subject of inheritance according to Islamic 
law, as an attack on the traditional law of 
succession (adat) in Minangkabau.15 
In Minangkabau, many Islamic schools 
with modern system and with deeper 
understanding of Islamic teachings appeared. 
The Adabiyah School, for example, even 
though it was similar to the HIS (Holland’s 
Inlandse School), yet the Islamic subjects were 
obligatory.16 The Thawalib school was more 
influential in west Sumatra. Haji Abdullah 
Ahmad and Haji Rasul taught there after 
their return from Mecca in 1904. The school 
developed further by giving the subjects not 
only concerning al-Qur’ân, Hadith and Tafsir 
but also Arabic and its branches such as 
Nahwu. The study of Arabic was intended to 
facilitate the study of the madhahib.17 These 
two examples of the schools in Minangkabau 
(West Sumatra) were an indication that 
Muslims in this area tried to make Islamic 
13 Deliar Noer, Gerakan Moderen Islam di Indonesia 1900-
1942, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), p. 39.
14 Deliar Noer, Gerakan Moderen Islam, p. 39.
15 Karel Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian 
Islam, (Amsterdam: Atlanta, GA, 1993), p. 135.
16 Deliar Noer, Gerakan Moderen Islam, p. 51. 
17 Deliar Noer, Gerakan Moderen Islam, p. 51.
education compete with the colonial school 
system, and at the same time they tried to 
improve the quality of belief of Indonesian 
Muslims.18
The socio-religious activities (education) 
of both ideologies in Java were also very 
great. For example, firstly, the existance of 
al-Jami’iyat al-Khairiyah, which was usually 
called Jamiat Khair. It was founded in Jakarta 
on July 17, 1905, and its major participation 
was in the field of education. The Importance 
of Jamiat Khair lies in the fact that it was 
the first representative of modern education 
introduced in Indonesia.19 Secondly, the 
existance of al-Irsyad as other educational 
institution. It was founded by Soorkatti 
who was one of the most important man 
in spreading reformist ideas in Indonesia. 
His concern for reform proved influential, 
and his effort to improve the quality of 
the Indonesian Muslim was clear. He was 
involved in formulating the Majlis Islam Ala 
Indonesia (MIAI)20, and established many 
al-Irsyad branches in different regions of 
Indonesia.21 The other important Islamic 
social organization in Java, until the present, 
is the Muhammadiyah. It was founded 
on November 18, 1912 in Yogjakarta. In 
1921 the Muhammadiyah had expanded its 
branches in all Indonesian regions, and its 
activities in the field of reform proved to 
be significant until the present day.22 The 
Muhammadiyyah becomes a strong national 
movement,23 now has more than 12.000 
schools, from madrasah and kindergartens 
to the university level. It also has mosques, 
hospitals, clinics, orphanages and other 
institutions.24 
The other representative of the Indonesian 
Muslim socio-religious activities in Java is the 
18 Fachry Ali, Bahtiar Effendy, Merambah Jalan, p. 70.
19 Fachry Ali, Bahtiar Effendy, Merambah Jalan, p. 71.
20 Fachry Ali, Bahtiar Effendy, Merambah Jalan, p. 71.
21 Deliar Noer, Gerakan Moderen Islam, p. 75.
22 Deliar Noer, Gerakan Moderen Islam, p. 88.
23 James L. Peacock, Gerakan Muhammadiyah, p. 26.
24 Ahmad Syafi’i Maarif, Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan, 
p. 63.
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Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union). It is usually 
called Persis, and was founded in 1920 in 
Bandung by a Muslim group interested in the 
study of Islamic teachings.25 Apart from its 
educational activity, the publication of many 
journals, such as Pembela Islam (Defense of 
Islam), was other its important activity, and 
through which Persis leaders strove for the 
spread of true Islamic teachings.26 The final 
representative is Nahdhatul Ulamâ (NU). 
It was established on January 31, 1926 
by Hasjim Asjari. It is one of the largest 
independent Islamic organizations in the 
world. Although it is hard to account, NU 
has approximately 30 million members. The 
establishment of NU is intended to spread 
Islamic teaching. It conducted educational 
activities through its network of around 
6,830 Islamic boarding schools, or pesantren, 
and of 44 universities which are involved 
in religious and general studies. Beside 
undertaking educational activities, it also, 
among other things, funds hospitals, and 
organizes communities into more coherent 
groups in order to help combat poverty.27 
Socio-Political Activities: 
Islam and Secular Nationalist
Both ideologies, along with socio-religious 
activities, also undertook socio-political 
activities. Both first entered upon by the 
Sarekat Islam (1911-1942). The development 
of this political party was intended to fulfill 
the political needs of Indonesian Muslims, 
and to assume a dominant position for 
Muslims in the political field at that time.28 
Thus, it gradually turned into a political 
organization from a mainly commercial 
organization. Hence, its first name was 
Sarekat Dagang Islam, and was founded 
by Haji Samanhudi on October 16, 1905 
in Solo in the central Java. However, its 
25 Deliar Noer, Gerakan Moderen Islam, p. 101.
26 Deliar Noer, Gerakan Moderen Islam, p. 103. 
27 En.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nahdlatul_Ulama, downloaded on 
November 15, 2014.
28 Deliar Noer, Gerakan Moderen Islam, p. 114.
name was changed into Sarekat Islam 
and was legalized by the Dutch colonial 
government on September 10, 1912 in Solo. 
This organization held Islam as one of its 
basic foundations.29 One reason, Islam was 
its basic foundation was that the Dutch 
colonial powers always tried to destroy Islam 
because they held it to be their greatest 
enemy in controlling Indonesia.30 Therefore, 
this organization was one of the largest all-
Indonesian Muslim political parties before 
independence,31 and its strong position did 
not stem from its leadership but from its 
united mass following.32 
Sarekat Islam’s purpose was to make 
Indonesia independent. Its membership 
included rural and urban people, and they 
stood against colonialism and imperialism. 
For a short period Sarekat Islam was 
successful in guarding Muslims under the 
banner of Islam, and became the national 
mass movement.33 But after 1917, the leaders 
of this party split over the issue of socialism 
and Islam. This happened specifically after 
the Russian revolution of October 1917. As 
the result, internal conflict arose, and some 
of its members left believing that the party 
was not equipped against imperialism. They 
withdraw from Sarekat Islam to form other 
political party, the Sarekat Islam Merah 
which became the Indonesian Communist 
Party (PKI) in 1921.34 
At the same time the feeling of nationalism 
grew. Indonesian nationalism first appeared 
as a result of the growing awareness of 
Muslim Indonesians in the social, political 
and intellectual fields.35 On the other hand, 
29 M. A. Gani, Cita Dasar & Pola Perjuangan Svarikat 
Islam, (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1984), p. 14.
30 M. A. Gani, Cita Dasar & Pola Perjuangan Svarikat 
Islam, p. 15.
31 C. A. 0. Van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects of Islam, p. 45.
32 Ahmad Syafi’i Maarif, Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan, 
p. 82.
33 Ahmad Syafi’i Maarif, Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan, 
p. 82.
34 Rosihan Anwar, “Islam and Politics,” p. 117.
35 H. Alamsjah Ratu Perwiranegara, Islam dan Pembangunan 
Politik di Indonesia, (Jakarta: CV. Haji Masagung, 1987), p. 150.
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secular nationalism also appeared as the result 
of the combination of Islam and Marxism. 
Therefore, the Problem of ideology among 
Muslims became more conflicting. Firstly, 
Muslims had to fix their internal difference 
to be able to compete with the nationalists, 
secularists or any others. In order to minimize 
the ideological difference among Indonesian 
Muslims, MIAI (Majlis Islam A’la Indonesia) 
was established on September 21, 1942 in 
Surabaya, as a potential forum for uniting 
Muslims. Secondly, at the same time, it was 
a place to compete with secular nationalists 
whom the Japanese tended to support to by 
the end of the Japanese era in Indonesia.36 
This phenomena lead to an unfair condition; 
when the investigating Body for the Efforts 
for the Preparation of the Independence of 
Indonesia (BPUUPKI) was held, the Muslim 
representatives were thinly represented.37 
Nonetheless, the issue between Islam and 
secular nationalism was severely discussed in 
that committee.38
Hence, both Muslim ideologies had to 
face the national secular ideology. This face to 
face is due to, according to Deliar Noer, the 
educational system, which was divided between 
secular and religious schools. Muslim scholars 
tried to overcome the secularization process 
by demanding the introduction of religious 
as well as secular subjects in both schools. 
But, this education gradually produced the 
dual character of leaders, that are secularly 
and the religiously oriented leaders. The 
development of these two orientations later 
on produced the political groupings, such as 
Indonesian National Party (PNI) belonged 
to secular nationalists.39 The face to face in 
politics, was called by certain scholars, a 
conflict between the santri and the abangan 
36 Ahmad Syafi’i Maarif, Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan, 
p. 96.
37 Ahmad Syafi’i Maarif, Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan, 
p. 104.
38 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, “Islam and Nationalism in 
Indonesia,” Mizan No. 4 Vol. I (1984), p. 14.
39 Deliar Nioer,”Islam as a Political Force in Indonesia,” 
Mizan No. 4 Vol.1 (1984), p. 34.
(nominal Muslims).40 The santris generally 
maintain that abangans will end up in hell, 
while the position of abangans, especially 
in the political arena, is very important in 
reshaping Indonesian Muslims.41 Therefore, 
in the political atmosphere the abangans 
were always suspicious of the santris, who 
believed that politic was not merely in 
the administrative matters but also had a 
connection with the spiritual, cultural and 
religious life of the nation.42
The Jakarta Charter was a proof that 
such conflict existed. The Jakarta Charter 
was the major result of the Indonesians’ 
agreement including the greater number 
of Muslims involved. As matter of social-
politics, this agreement would purpose to 
make the foundation of state. From the 
rank of sequence of its formulation, of 
course before the final formulation, it was 
written in it seven words indicating that 
“Sharia” should be implemented amongst the 
Muslim community. When it was discussed 
in the final stage, however, non-Muslim 
community, to some extent supported by 
secular nationalists, objected to the seven 
written words, and therefore they were 
abolished preserving the transcendence of 
the unity. As because of the Jakarta Charter 
ratified on August 18, 1945, as the preamble 
of constitution, the seven written words not 
incorporated completely. Thus, Indonesia 
neither became the Islamic, nor the secular 
state but it was Pancasila state. 
The face to face in ideology encouraged 
the formation of new Islamic political 
organization, named Masyumi party. It 
which was founded on November, 7/8, 1945 
in Jogjakarta and was a broad political party 
that encompassed all shades of opinion within 
the Indonesian Muslims. The establishment 
40 K. E. Ward, The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin 
Indonesia, (Ithaca: Modem Indonesia Project Southeast Asia 
Program Comell University, 1970), p. 2.
41 K. E. Ward, The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin 
Indonesia, p. 2.
42 K. E. Ward, The Foundation of the Partai Muslimin 
Indonesia, p. 6.
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of this party was intended to be a forum 
for the implementation of Islamic teachings 
and Islamic law in the Indonesian state.43 
Unfortunately, the Masjumi did not maintain 
their initial unity and strength. The first 
schism took place in 1947, when PSSI 
[the Indonesian Islamic Association Party] 
reconstituted itself, partly an opportunistic 
maneuver by some Islamic leaders to gain 
seats in the Sjarifuddin cabinet. The second 
schism came in 1952, when the NU became 
an overt political party and left the Masjumi. 
This split was contrast to the agreement 
ratified in Jogjakarta on 7/8th November 
in 1945 which issued that the Masyumi as 
a single of Islamic party for reaching the 
independence.
The internal conflict in the Islamic struggle 
was the difference of the fundamental purpose 
among the Islamic political force. Before the 
general election of 1955, there were four 
majors of Islamic parties; Masyumi, NU, Perti 
and PSII. Even though the appearance of these 
parties as the power of Muslim community 
in the political force, each party displayed its 
own rule that resulted in the disintegration 
of the Islamic struggle. As a result of such 
internal conflict was that in general election 
in 1955 Islamic parties were defeated as can 
be seen from the proportion of the seats in 
the Constituent Assembly.44 
A new situation arose in 1958, with 
the establishment of Sukarno’s Guided 
Democracy. The Masjumi resisted Sukarno’s 
authoritarian rule and was banned in August, 
1960, and that made the political atmosphere 
became heated again. On the other hand, 
the position of PKI (the Communist party) 
increased stronger then before and even 
gained Sukarno’s protection. By this, the 
feeling of involving into the political force 
43 Ahmad Syafi’i Maarif, Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan, 
p. 110.
44 M. Rusli Karim, Nuansa Gerak Politik Era 1980-an di 
Indonesia, (Jogjakarta: PT. Media Widya Mandala 1992), p. 
16-17. B. J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, 
(Haque: Martinus Nijhoff 1982).
among Muslim community was encouraged 
again, though their power gradually became 
weaker. Evidently, ABRI (the Indonesian 
armed force) and Muslims cooperated each 
other in the struggle to rout the remnants 
of the PKI and eliminate Sukarno’s power, 
and finally they could abort the PKI coup 
in September 30, 1965. 
Henceforth, the Muslim community 
attained the victory and came out on the 
top. The factors involving the capability of 
defeating PKI was not merely because they 
were the majority, but also this event was 
considered as religious duties “Jihad” against 
the enemy of the Muslims. The abortive of 
PKI, however, was claimed by the Muslim 
community as their victory. Therefore, they 
wanted Masyumi to be re-acknowledged 
as Islamic political party, but this desire 
was encountered by ABRI. The position of 
ABRI on the other hand, was very strict 
and strain to oppose whom deviated from 
Pancasila.45 Muslims once again receded 
into the background. 
The Change of Ideological Orientation: 
Cultural Islam 
The New Order became the political elite, 
and was the result of Muslim struggle 
against PKI.46 At the beginning of the 
New Order, the government, which was 
mostly dominated by the military, was 
hostile to Islam at the beginning. Pressure 
and intimidation to the Muslims continued 
to be encouraged, wearing headscarves in 
school was prohibited, Ramadan holiday 
was eliminated, khutbah manuscripts 
were continually cencored. Permission of 
Islamic activities was complicated, and not 
infrequently a preachers who were asked 
to come down from the pulpit preaching 
by force by the authorities because they 
undermined the authority of the government. 
45 Rosihan Anwar, “Islam and Politics,” p. 118.
46 M. Rusli Karim, Islam dan Konflik Politik Era Orde 
Baru, (Jogjakarta: PT. Media Widya Mandala, 1992), p. 2.
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The majority of New Order ruling group, 
including Suharto himself, were nominal 
Muslims rather than santri Muslims. In the 
1960s, the ruling group refused the influence 
of Muslim parties. In 1970s, there were nine 
parties, the ruling group consolidated all the 
political parties into two parties: PPP (the 
Development Unity Party) was based on 
Islam, provided place for Muslim interests, 
and PDI (the Indonesian Democratic 
Party) based on national democracy. Beside 
consolidating, they also formed a political 
power, named Golkar, as an arm of the 
armed forces and the government as a single 
majority of political organization in the 
New Order era. PPP was based on Islam, 
provided place for Muslim interests, and 
PDI based on national democracy.
PPP and PDI were under the control 
of the government, and until PPP was not 
deeply rooted among society because all the 
religious matters after that were handled by 
the government.47 The Muslim community 
suspected that Ali Murtopo was behind 
all these events. He was involved in the 
formation of Golkar and in the restriction 
of Muslims and other political parties. In 
1973, the People’s Consultative Assembly 
(MPR) proposed to make mystical belief 
acquire a similar position to religion. During 
the same legislative session, the assembly 
unified the law on marriage and divorce by 
limiting the jurisdiction of Islamic courts. 
But these two decisions, were eventually 
defeated by Muslim forces. In 1983, PPP was 
forced, as well as other parties, to recognize 
Pancasila as the source of every social and 
political organization. Thus, Golkar was 
able to strengthen its ability, as a starting 
point, so as to reach its peak.48 This kind 
of restriction in politics laid by New Order 
invites many interpretations from scholars 
such as W.F. Wertheim who argues that the 
47 M. Rusli Karim, Islam dan Konflik Politik Era Orde 
Baru, p. 4. 
48 M. Rusli Karim, Nuansa Gerak Politik Era 1980-an, p. 
16-17.
suitable pattern for Indonesian political life 
is through the natural phenomena of the 
“patron-client”, i.e. the relationship between 
patron and client constituting an endless of 
relationship.49 
After realizing of the failure in politics 
to some extent, Muslims community 
started to improve the communal activities. 
The activities based on an idea that the 
Muslim community should not merely 
focus their attention on the political 
force, but also should focus on education, 
religious instruction, leadership training 
and writings. Those were intended to be 
reinforcing of within Muslim community 
itself. According to most Indonesian Muslim 
scholars, including Ahmad Syafi’i Maarif, 
however, though Muslims have failed in 
politics but there is still the opportunity 
to develop the “socio-cultural conscience 
and activities.” The cultural opportunity 
should continue to appreciate the principles 
of democracy in socio-politics. This notion 
becomes a “culturally Islamic ideology”. For 
a peaceful implementation of that ideology 
mutual understanding between Islam and 
nationalism should be promoted.50 
The idea above, according to Hefner51, 
has been laid down in the late 1960s. There 
were several intellectuals who had a great 
strategy that thought “political Islam” was 
restricted by the government, it should not 
be “equated with government opposition 
to ‘cultural’ or ‘civil Islam’”. It meant that 
Islam could serve as a source of ethical and 
cultural guidance. Therefore, the relationship 
between the government and Muslims 
should be kept. This view was advocated 
by a number of young Muslim intellectuals, 
and they were independent. According to 
Muslim intellectuals, in this case represented 
49 Kuntowijoyo, “Religion, State and Social Formation in 
Indonesia,” Mizan No. 3 Vol. I (1984), p. 15.
50 Ahmad Syafi’i Maarif, “Islam in Indonesia,” p. 7.
51 Robert W. Hefner, “Islam, State and Civil Society: ICMI 
and the Struggle for the Indonesia Middle Class,” Indonesia. 56 
(October,1993): p. 1-36.
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by Nurcholish Madjid, the Muslim parties 
were unable to show their capacity, and 
consequently, the Muslim community could 
not develop a new organization, that is 
“capable of winning the moral sympathies 
of all Indonesian Muslims.” According to 
Madjid, the majority of Muslim politicians 
“sacralized” their institution based on the 
Islamic state. He offers as a solutions that 
“secularization” is preserving Islamic values 
among the Muslim community (not the 
same with secularization in the western 
values). Madjid, however, was challenged 
by other old intellectuals, such as H. M. 
Rasyidi, Hamka and Muhammad Natsir. 
But Madjid, along with other intellectuals, 
developed the new strategy as a renewal of 
Islam, especially in education and social 
welfare. 
The new strategy has been making 
campuses became a place for Muslim 
students to hold Islamic activities. In 
the 1970s, the rapid growth of Muslim 
initiatives in university campuses were able 
to Islamize the secular universities with 
different Islamic activities. Those activities 
in turn improved among the Middle class, 
the “Salman movement” is a good example 
of this phenomena. In 1986, Madjid 
founded an association for urban and middle 
class people who do not have a sufficient 
background for understanding Islam. The 
result is that mosques and prayer hall in 
hotels, government departments or offices 
have grown. Also, during the 1980’s many 
Muslims entered the government bureaucracy 
from the center to the regions, and also 
strengthened the power of the New Order 
in the accumulation frame of Islamic civil 
and military, and promoted Muslim interests. 
As a result, most Muslims enjoyed to 
recognize the reality of the New Order and 
to undertake initiatives that could enhance 
their influence within its institution. This 
development of socio-cultural conscience 
and activities (cultural Islam) indicated that 
there has been significant revitalization of 
Islam in Indonesia particularly among young 
people.52
The government, on the other hand, 
supported cultural Islamic programs. The 
government identified with the religious 
activities and gave a chance to the promotion 
of Islamic values. Thus, in 1974 the 
government reexamined the decision of 
Consultative Assembly of the mystical belief. 
Furthermore, the Department of Religious 
Affairs, with its decision No. 70, 1978, 
banned missionary members of any religion 
among citizens who already professed a faith. 
To strengthen this decision, the Department 
of Religious Affairs joined with the Home 
Affairs in 1979. The department of Religious 
Affairs also expanded the institutions of 
Islamic education and da’wah throughout 
Indonesia, such as IAIN. This institution 
which begun in the 1960s and during the 
1970s and 1980s produced large numbers 
of graduates trained in different fields. 
Moreover, the program on the infrastructural 
development was also supported by the 
government. The government constructed 
mosques, prayer halls and Islamic schools, 
especially in areas regarded as weakly 
committed to Islam. There was a program 
supported by Suharto himself called “Amal 
Bakti Pancasila.” This program has contructed 
around 400 mosques, and has helped around 
1,000 Muslim proselytizers. 
The process of cultural Islam was not 
touched in the political area. In 1985, the 
government forced all social and political 
organizations to accept the Pancasila, as the 
basics for each organization. According to 
Hafner53, as the result of accepting Pancasila, 
the process of cultural Islam or civil Islam 
was able to go on because Muslims were not 
involved in a single party, rather they were 
spread in all parties, and were committed to 
Islam just the same. Therefore, Islam can be 
52 Howard M. Fiderspiel, Muslim Intellectuals and National 
Development in Indonesia, (New York: Nova Publishers, Inc., 
1991), p. 185.
53 Robert W. Hefner, “Islam, State and Civil Society”.
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promoted to all parties. Furthermore, more 
nominal Muslims change their belief to santri 
faith. The foundation of ICMI December 
6-8, 1990 is a clear evidence of the process 
of cultural Islam among the middle and elite 
classes. ICMI, under chairman Habibie, is 
intended to unify Muslim intellectuals under 
a single association. 
The foundation of ICMI, according 
to Hafner, seems duplicate of Persami 
(Persatuan Sarjana Muslim Indonesia), 
founded in 1964. This organization was 
supposed to combat the intellectuals, who 
were influenced by the Communist party. The 
Persami, at that time, was active and played 
a major role in supporting the New order in 
1967. However, in 1968, this organization 
declined, due to internal disputes and the 
disinterest of the government. Whatever 
it is, the existence of ICMI, according to 
Hafner, allowed for Muslim activities not to 
be regarded as hostile, and not the subject 
of political control by the government. 
The evidence can be seen, a month after 
the first congress of ICMI, the media gave 
interesting attention to Islamic activities, 
such as religious discussions. Whatever the 
assumption of the founding of ICMI, in 
the eyes of certain Muslim intellectuals may 
be, ICMI provides Muslims a historical 
opportunity, in terms of resources and 
political incorporation to undertake the 
initiative of further development of Islam, 
such as the establishment of Islamic bank. 
It also provides an additional chance for 
institutional consolidation of the new 
Muslim middle class. So, ICMI remains 
as important way for advancing Muslim 
social interests in government and society.
Cultural Islam: Its Impact on Islamic 
Law
When the Dutch arrived in the Netherlands 
East Indies (Indonesia) in 1596, there were 
several Islamic kingdoms, weather in Sumatra 
or in Java. In eastern Indonesia, there were 
Goa which is located in South Sulawesi 
(Celebes) and Ternate.54 As a general 
characteristic of Islamic law, Nicholson 
put his theory according to the application 
of Islamic law particularly in Java and 
Sumatra. For him the Islamic law was rather 
unobservable because of interaction with 
the adat (customary Law). So, he put his 
theory on three types of law accommodation. 
First, both Islam and adat present together. 
Second, Islamic elements replacing adat 
elements, and the final accommodation is 
the modification of them.55 
Since the Dutch changed their position 
from a Trading Company (VOC) to that 
of ruling all areas of the Netherlands 
East Indies (Indonesia), their policy was 
always more or less against Islam. This is 
because they observed that the majority of 
Indonesians are concerned with adat rather 
than with Islamic Law. Therefore in order to 
manage country which includes Europeans, 
Orientals and Native people, the Colonial 
Legal Administration was very pluralistic 
and separated the system of private law; as 
a result, conflict always rose.56 According to 
the administrative structure, the political 
position of Native courts, including Islamic 
courts were directly governed by the Colonial 
Government which made the authority of 
local rulers limited.57
With reference to Islamic Law in the 
early coming of the Dutch, it was actually 
applied to some extent in certain areas where 
Islam had a stronger influence than the other 
elements. This application resulted in the 
establishment of Islamic courts, and at the 
same time, the Muslim judges (Penghulu) 
were appointed by local rulers. For example 
the Islamic courts in Aceh, in Jambi, in 
54 Tengku, Ismail, Yakub, Sejarah Islam di Indonesia, 
(Jakarta: Widfjaya, 1973), p. 32-44.
55 Clara Kibby Nicholson, The Introduction of Islam into 
Sumatra and Java: A Study in Social Change, (Ph.D. Dessertation, 
Michigan University, 1982), p. 157.
56 Clara Kibby Nicholson, The Introduction of Islam into 
Sumatra and Java, p. 249. 
57 Hooker, A Concise Legal History of South-East Asia, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 189.
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South and East Kalimantan, and South 
Sulawesi. Likewise, Islamic courts in Java 
had been in existence since the sixteenth 
century.58
No matter how the local rulers and the 
Muslim judges did their duties through the 
Islamic courts according to Islamic Law, 
the Colonial Government determined that 
what is concerning the Islamic law should 
be under the control of the Government 
authority. In 1808 the Colonial Government 
made a letter of instruction stating that 
the Penghulu should deal with the issue 
of Muslim marriages and inheritance only. 
This regulation implies that the colonial 
government did not interfere with Penghulu 
authority, and the existence of Islamic courts 
was acknowledged as well. 59 
When the British took over Java 
(1811-1816), Sir Stamford Rafless divided 
the administration of courts into two 
types; Islamic courts which was headed 
by the Penghulu, and dealt with Muslim 
marriages, divorces and inheritance. The 
other was district courts (civil courts or 
landraad) which were based on adat. In 
1819 the Commissioner General ordered 
that the Penghulu should attend the civil 
courts as advisers only concerning the adat 
and religious law because the Colonial 
Government assumed that adat and religious 
law were identical. 60 In 1828, however, 
according to a decree of the Commissioner 
General in Jakarta, it was decided that 
the conflict of Muslim marriages should 
be undertaken by district courts which 
consisted of the Penghulu and the head of 
district courts. Furthermore, in 1835, the 
Colonial Goverment issued the regulation 
in which Muslim marriages and inheritance 
for the area of Java had to be decided by 
58 Muhammad Atho Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of 
Indonesian Ulama: A study of Islamic Legal Thought in Indonesia, 
(Ph.D. Dessertation, Michigan University, 1991), p. 65-66.
59 Muhammad Atho Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of 
Indonesian Ulama, p. 66.
60 Ahmad Bin Mohd. Ibrohim,” The Administration of 
Muslim Law in In Indonesia,” Islamic Culture 43 (1969), p. 10.
the Penghulu, and the execution of this 
decision, to be implemented only after the 
approval of the district courts. 61
As regard Javanese Muslims, the Recht 
Reglement of 1854 in article 82 it is stated 
that civil matters had to be dealt by the 
Penghulu or by adat leaders. But in 1882 
William III who was the Dutch king made 
a regulation by his Royal Decree. No. 24, 
in which the existence of Priesterraaden 
(Islamic Courts or Priest Courts) had 
similar territory with district courts. 
Furthermore, all Islamic court decisions and 
their executions did not have to be active 
on district courts anymore. In place of the 
previous regulation (1835), all Penghulus 
decisions had to be reported to the regents 
(Heads of region) regularly.62
When Snouck Hurgronje was the 
advisor of native affairs in the Netherlands 
East Indies from 1859-1936, he made a 
strong demand to abolish the Islamic courts. 
It is due to the regulation of 1882 which 
was published in Staatblad No. 152, which 
disturbed him because according to him 
the “terms of Prieshood” was never found 
in Islam. Moreover, this regulation will 
directly establish Islamic courts against the 
role of adat generally, and against the role 
of the aristocracy (prinyayi) particularly in 
the Java area. An example drawn by Benda 
who explained that the Mataram kingdom 
structure was influenced strongly by India 
toward Ningrat (Aristocrat)63 and Hurgronje 
also was impressed that adat actually limited 
the role of Islam in practice. Therefore, if 
the regulation of 1882 was implemented 
conflict would arise. But, he believed that 
Islam for the Netherlands East Indies 
Muslim was not only a religion, but also 
a political force. Consequently, his job 
was to abolish Islam in order to make the 
61 Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama, p. 67-69.
62 Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama, p. 67-69.
63 Harry J. Benda,”Kontinuitas dan Perubahan dalam 
Islam di Indonesia,” in Sejarah dan Masyarakat, ed. Taufik 
Abdullah, (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1987), p. 100.
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Netherlands a mother country. 64 
To reach this purpose, Hurgronje used 
the power of adat against Islam in his so 
called strategy “ Theorie-Receptie” (reception 
Theory). According to Hutagalung this 
theory was applied in I. S. (Indische Staats 
Regeling ) of 1929 mentioning that Islamic 
Law was not Indonesian Law. Therefore 
according to this theory, Islamic Law could 
be implemented it was needed and was not 
in contradiction with adat.65 
The realization of his desire was in Java 
and in Madura where superior native courts 
were made, with the provision of Islamic 
courts too which were limited to marriage, 
repudiation, reconciliation and divorce. The 
Colonial Government in a revision in 1931 
preserved the Islamic court institutions, but 
Penghulus were appointed throughout those 
two areas where the superior native courts 
existed with same competence of Islamic 
courts. While the other areas were still 
governed by old enactment and customary 
practices, the Islamic courts in Java and 
in Madura were regulated by the new 
revision, and in the case of proper affairs 
and inheritance were dealt with by district 
courts. Finally this phenomena remained 
until the independence of Indonesia. 66
After independence, Islamic law always 
stands along with the fluctuation of 
Indonesian Muslims politics. In general, for 
more than half a century Muslims receded 
into the background in the politics. The 
Muslim majority in Indonesia had been 
unable to overcome its internal and external 
conflict and achieve political unity and power. 
The internal conflict was the difference of 
the fundamental purpose among the Islamic 
political force. Even though the appearance 
of these parties as the power of Muslim 
64 Rohani Abdurrahim, Muslim in Indonesia and the Nation 
of an Islamic State, (Selangor: Dewan Pustaka Islam, 1991), p. 3-4.
65 Muara P. Hutagalung, Hukum Islam dalam Era 
Pembangunan, (Ind. Hill Co. 1985), p. 17-18.
66 B. Ter Haar, Adat Law in Indonesia, (New York: Institute 
of Pacific Relations, 1948), p. 26-28.
community in the political force, each party 
displayed its own rule that resulted in the 
disintegration of the Islamic struggle. The 
external conflict is Muslims faced secular 
nationalists. The Jakarta Charter was a proof 
of that external conflict. 
The Islamic law has light since Indonesian 
muslims have changed their ideology to cultural 
Islam. The idea is that Islam could serve as 
a source of ethical and cultural guidance. So 
the Muslim community should not merely 
focus their attention on the political force, 
but also should focus on education, religious 
instruction, leadership training and writings. 
With cultural Islam, then Muslims have not 
been as a threat to the state based on Pancasila. 
Sympathy of the government began 
especially from the New Order regime. The 
sympathy demonstrated with a number of 
political policies that brought together the 
aspirations of Muslims. Those policies, among 
others, are the Marriage Law No. 1 of 1974 
which was followed by Government Regulation 
No. 9 of 1975 on the Implementation of the 
Marriage Act. Further provisions on wakaf of 
Owned Land in Government Regulation No. 
28 of 1977. All these are new trends that can 
be seen as a sign of reconciliation between the 
government and Muslims after two decades 
of the antagonist. 
In 1989, the government also filed 
a Religious Judicature bill containing 
provisions that for those who are Muslims 
apply Islamic law in matters of marriage, 
inheritance, charity (wakaf), grants (hibah) 
and sodaqoh. Politically, bill was supported 
by the Indonesian armed forces faction, 
and by the fraction of Golkar, both initially 
supported the non-Muslim groups. But 
this bill still got a rejection of the secular 
nationalist groups who rated this bill, 
including the Marriage Bill, there had been 
a link with the Islamic state and the Jakarta 
Charter as well as. However, the concern 
was over after President Suharto gave the 
assurance that the government would not 
enforce the Jakarta Charter. After that, 
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further discussions of the draft went well, 
and became the Religious Courts Law No. 7 
of 1989, which also placed Religious Court 
as a state judicial institution regulated in 
Basic Law on Judicial Power No. 14 of 1970. 
In 1991, the compilation of Islamic 
Law was made with Presidential Instruction 
No. 1 of 1991, then in 1992 the Banking 
Act was made and became the Law No. 7 
of 1992. To further strengthen the legal 
position of mu’amalah, the Banking Act has 
also been updated with the Law No.10 of 
1998 on Banking, which further reinforced 
the implementation of Islamic law in the 
field of banking. The Bank of Indonesia 
also held Shariah Council. In 1999, the 
government also established Zakat Law No. 
38 of 1999.
The existence of the compilation of 
Islamic law is thought to be a progressive and 
development for Islamic law in Indonesia. It 
is a renovation especially for Islamic justice. 
The Islamic law, in general, is taken from 
Qur’an, Hadits and ijtihad (Investigation) of 
Ulama. In contrast, the material of Islamic 
law is found more in Fiqh books written by 
outhoritized ulama many centuries ago. The 
circumstance which happens in Indonesia 
show that mazhab Syafi’i is primarily 
accommodated if it is compared to any 
other mazhabs. The implementation of the 
Islamic juctice from the colonial period 
until the independence of Indonesia was 
connected to fiqh books in both process 
and decision of law.67 
Because of this, the government made a 
positive statement for the role of the Islamic 
justice in regulation No. 7 of 1989, which 
required compilation in order to renovate 
the Islamic law for Indonesian Muslims. 
The reasons for this are: (a) as has been 
mentioned early, the reference for Islamic 
law is fiqh. That means the Islamic justice 
is not based on law but on a certain ulama 
67 Zaini Ahmad Noeh, Peradilan Agama Islam di Indonesia, 
(Jakarta: PT. Intermasa, 1990).
perspective. This is absolutely against the 
principle of law No. 14 of 1970. (b) Those 
fiqh books written in Arabic are difficult 
to be understood by junior lawyers. (c) 
Those Fiqh books probably are relevant 
to the time when the ulama lived. But, 
they should be reconsidered before being 
adopted in Indonesia because of dissimilar 
requirements. (d) Each ulama based his book 
on his opinion, so it is considerably biased. 
This fact lead to the difficulty in petition.68
So, the compilation is intended to give 
something concerning the law more certain 
to answer problems. The formation process, 
involving ulama and intellectual Muslims, 
made the compilation more sure because 
it is taken from various Fiqh books and 
Islamic legal research in social development, 
and then they are collected and formulated 
in easy Indonesian as a reference. But the 
compilation is not a final effort to develop 
and to renovate the Islamic law in Indonesia. 
This can be seen from the following 
percentages of three Compilation Books. 
Marriage law, inheritance law and wakaf law. 
78% is about marriage law, 18% is about 
inheritance law and 4% is about wakaf 
law. The compilation is not the ultimate 
attempt to develop Islamic law in Indonesia 
in order to respond to the problems with 
greater certainty and surity. 
Conclusion
The study on the history of Indonesian 
Muslims ideologies indicates that Indonesian 
Islam is the product of a historical process in 
which Indonesian Muslims always struggle to 
strengthen Islamic values in the life of every 
Indonesian Muslims, and to influence the 
state as well. In the social-religious fields, it 
seems that although having different ideology, 
Indonesia Muslims believes that education is 
68 Wasit Aulawi, Kompilasi Hukum Islam dalam Sistem 
Hukum Nasional., Karya Ilmiah disampaikan pada Upacara 
Pengukuhan Guru Besar Tetap dalam Ilmu Hukum Fikih IAIN 
Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta, 1989.
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very important, while in the socio-political 
arena, the ideological conflict is between 
Islam and secular nationalism. But, during 
the New Order, in 1970s, the process of 
Islamic ideology changed to cultural Islam, 
in which mutual understanding between 
Islam and nationalism was reconciled. 
Through the recent ideology, Islamic law 
apparently could develope further.
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